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TREBLE DAMAGES IN NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE
CORPS CONTRACTS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND HAWRONSKY
V. COMMISSIONER

Richard C. E. Beck•

I. INTRODUCTION
This is the second of two articles concerning the deductibility of
treble damages for breach of the service agreement in a National Health
Service Corps ("NHSC") scholarship contract.
The first article'
2
concerned the decision in Stroud v. United States. There the District
Court for the District of South Carolina erroneously denied a deduction
for the treble damages on the theory that because the tuition and living
stipend had been tax-exempt, the damages were expenses "allocable to"
tax-exempt income within the meaning of I.R.C. § 265(a)(l). 3 As shown
at some length in that article, however, I.RC. § 265(a)(l) does not apply
because the treble damages are not incurred in order to obtain a tax-free
scholarship, which had already been received many years earlier, but
rather to buy out the NHSC service obligation in order to practice
medicine elsewhere. 4
Oddly enough, in the very same year that Stroud was decided, the
Tax Court also mistakenly denied a deduction for exactly the same
NHSC triple damages in Hawronsky v. Commissioner, 5 but on an
entirely different and completely umelated theory, namely that the
'Professor of Law, New York Law School. My thanks to Professor Jacob Todres, to Robert Wood,
Esq., to my research assistant Karen Cross, and to my former student Frank Langella, who all made
helpful suggestions. Thanks also to New York Law School for its generous support.
1. See Richard C. E. Beck, Deductibility of Treble Damages Paid for Breach of National
Health Service Corps Scholarship Contracts: The Misuse of /.R.C. § 265(a)(l) in Stroud v. United
States and of the Origin of the Claim Test in Keane v. Commissioner, I CHARLESTON L. REV. I
(2006).
2. 906 F. Supp. 990 (D.S.C. 1995), vacated on other grounds by 94 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1996).
3. Id. at 995-96.
4. See Beck, supra note I, at 22-24.
5. 105 T.C. 94 (1995), ajf'd, 98 F.3d 1338 (5th Cir. 1996).
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damages constitute a "fine or similar payment to a government for the
violation of any law" within the meaning of I.R.C. § 162(f). 6 Three
years later, yet a third unrelated and erroneous theory was invoked to
deny a deduction for interest paid on the same damages in Keane v.
Commissioner, 7 a 1998 Tax Court Memorandum Decision, which failed
to mention either Hawronsky or Stroud. None of these decisions has
been questioned in the tax literature, and Hawronsky and Stroud are both
cited in many reference works as if they were sound. 8
The deduction in question was for statutorily prescribed liquidated
damages paid by physicians whose medical education had been paid for
by the National Health Services Corps ("NHSC") in exchange for a
contractual obligation to practice medicine in an underserved area
designated by the NHSC. 9 NHSC scholarships provide both tuition and
fees for health care training, and also a monthly stipend for living
expenses. 10 The service obligation may be satisfied by working directly
for a governmental agency, or by working in a private clinic, or even by
independent private practice, provided the location is approved in
advance by the NHSC. 11 Physicians who default on their service
obligation are required by the contract to pay statutory damages of triple
the amount expended by the government for the scholarship plus triple
an amount of deemed interest calculated according to a fixed formula in
the contract. 12
6. Id. at 101.
7. 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2046 (1998).
8. E.g., BORIS I. BITTKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS iJ 11.04[2] n.121 (2d ed., RIA 2006).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 254o(b)(l)(A) (2006).
10. See Lora C. Siegler, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Provisions of National
Health Service Corps Scholarship Program, I 08 A.LR. FED. 313, 320 (1992).
11. Id.
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 254o(b). According to 42 U.S.C. § 254o(b)(l)(A), the treble damages are
formulated using A= 3 [phi] (T - SIT), where
"A" is the amount the United States is entitled to recover, " [phi] " is the sum of the
amounts paid under this subpart to or on behalf of the individual and the interest on such
amounts which would be payable if at the time the amounts were paid they were loans
bearing interest at the maximum legal prevailing rate, as determined by the Treasurer of
the United States; "t" is the total number of months in the individual's period of
obligated service; and "s" is the number of months of such period served by him in
accordance with section 338C [42 U.S.C. § 254m] or a written agreement under section
338D [42 U.S.C. § 254n].
42 U.S.C. § 254o(b)(l)(A). Such damages are due if the participant fails to begin or to complete his
service obligation "for any reason," which is mitigated only by 42 § U.S.C. 254o(d)(2), according to
which the obligation of service or treble damages may be waived pursuant to regulations delegated
to the NHSC only if"compliance by the individual is impossible or would involve extreme hardship
to the individual and if enforcement of such obligation with respect to any individual would be
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The first version of the statute, which was in effect from 1972 until
1977 required only single damages, that is, a return of the government's
money plus deemed interest, as many similar State programs still do.
The single-damages version was repealed in 1976 and replaced by the
current triple-damage provision in 1977 . 13 The purpose of the new
provision was apparently to provide the NHSC with a stiff penalty to
enforce the service obligation, and the NHSC has often used the threat of
treble damages to coerce compliance. 14
According to 42 USC§ 254o(b)(l)(A), the treble damages are due
if the participant fails to begin or to complete his service obligation "for
any reason," which is mitigated only by 42 §USC 254o(d)(2), according
to which the obligation of service or treble damages may be waived
pursuant to regulations delegated to the HHS only if "compliance by the
individual is impossible or would involve extreme hardship to the
individual and if enforcement of such obligation with respect to such
individual would be unconscionable."
The federal courts have decided more than three dozen reported
cases over the question whether the outsized treble-damages provision of
the statutory contract is enforceable. 15 All but one of the physicians who
resisted payment lost. 16 The reported decisions almost always arise
because of disputes growing out of the system by which the NHSC
assigns participants to locations for their tours of service. 17 The
assignment process is left entirely to the discretion of the NHSC, 18
which consults with state and local authorities and decides which
unconscionable."
13. Siegler, supra note 10, at 320 n.2.
14. Donald Lohman, Comment, The Final Frustration of Defaulting NHSC Scholars?: United
States v. Hatcher, 19 J.C. & U.L. 385, 385 (1993); see also ExpectMore.gov: National Health
Service Corps, http://www.whitehouse.gov/OMB/expectmore/detail. l 0000278.2005.html (last
visited Feb. 4, 2006).
15. See generally Siegler, supra note 10.
16. Seigler, supra note 10, at 28 (citing Rendleman v. Sullivan, 760 F. Supp. 842 (D. Or.
1991)). Rendleman lost his appeal, but won in practice because the District court kept remanding his
case to the NHSC for reconsideration until the NHSC finally got the point. See Beck, supra note I,
at l.B. I.
17. There is considerable friction between participants and the NHSC. See Kristine Marietti
Byrnes, Is There a Primary Care Doctor in the House? The Legislation Needed to Address a
National Shortage, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 799, and sources cited therein. A 1990 study reported that
13% of participants had failed to do their service obligations and paid damages instead. Id. at 813
n.68 (citing 1990 H.R. REP. No. 642, at 15 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4289, 4289).
Another 1992 study reported considerable unhappiness among participants, many of whom felt they
were treated like "indentured servants." Id. at 814 n.71 (citing Donald E. Pathman et al., The
Comparative Retention of National Health Service Corps and Other Rural Physicians, 268 J. AM.
MED. Ass'N 1552, 1553-54 (1992)).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2541(f)(l)(B)(iv).
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locations qualify for status as Health Professional Shortage Areas
(HPSA). Then the NHSC draws up an annual list of available locations
and categorizes them by priority. This is the Health Professional
Opportunity List ("HPOL"). Only sites on the HPOL qualify for
fulfillment of the service obligation. Participants may apply to serve at
any site on the HPOL. The earlier participants apply, the more choice
they have. Also, they can virtually assure their first choice if they
choose the highest priority (i.e. least desirable) locations. If a participant
has not matched to a location by a certain time, the NHSC will assign
him to any location it chooses. And if the NHSC declares a participant
to be in default for not following its regulations, 19 the NHSC will always
forbear to enforce the treble damages obligation if the participant
promises again to serve and signs a "forbearance agreement" confessing
default and his obligation to pay. But these participants have no choice
and must serve wherever the NHSC orders them, and so they often
default again until eventually they are forced to pay. 20 The tax question
is whether the treble damages are deductible.
The main thesis of this article is that Hawronsky is erroneous and
the deduction should be allowed because I.R.C. § 162(f) does not apply.
The taxpayer did pay a "fine or similar penalty to the government," but
he did not pay it "for the violation of any law," which is a necessary
element of I.R.C. § l 62(f). The taxpayer merely breached his NHSC
contract. This crucial issue went completely unnoticed by the court and
the parties. Because I.R.C. § 162(f) does not apply, the treble damages
are (except for the original tax-free scholarship itself) a deductible
business expense of buying out the NHSC service obligation. 21
19. Disputes ending in default often arise because the participant's professional or personal
situation may change during the five to eight years of his medical education, making the service
obligation unexpectedly burdensome. For example, the participant may decide to specialize in a
field which is unacceptable to the NHSC, or his family situation may make it inconvenient or
impossible for him to serve at the site to which the NHSC assigns him. Often the dispute is over
whether the location in which the participant has decided to practice does (or should) qualify as an
approved site. For this reason Byrnes concludes that a loan repayment program would be more
effective than the scholarship program, because participants would already have made their career
choices before joining, and the Joan repayments would take place only after actual service. Brynes,
supra note 17, at 846.
20. See, e.g., Seigler, supra note JO, at 26 (citing United States v. Redovan 656 F. Supp. 121
(E.D. Pa. 1986), ajf'd, 826 F.2d 1057 (3rd Cir. 1987)).
21. The correct answer today, however, may be that the treble damages should be capitalized
now that the "lndopco Regulations," Treas. Reg. § l .263(a)-4, -5 (2004), have become final as of
December I, 2003. These regulations require capitalization of a payment made by a taxpayer in
order to terminate a contract providing the payee with the exclusive right to acquire or use the
taxpayer's property or services. This regulation appears to apply to the Hawronsky situation, and if
so, to render Revenue Ruling 68-43 obsolete. Treas. Reg. § J.263(a)-4(d)(7)(i)(B). Similarly, a

2007]

TREBLE DAMAGES FOR NHSC CONTRACTS

133

Along the way, however, the article finds much else to criticize in
this problematic litigation. First, the "fine or similar penalty" language
of I.R.C. § 162(f) is poorly conceived and has led to great confusion.
Second, the judge-made "public policy doctrine," which I.R.C. § 162(f)
was intended to simplify and replace was itself highly questionable, and
probably ought to have been legislated away rather than codified. And
finally, the NHSC's colossal treble-damage penalty seems harshly
disproportionate to any actual harm that a scholarship participant's
breach might cause, and probably should never have been enacted.
II. HAWRONSKY AND l.R.C. § 162(F)
In Hawronsky, the taxpayer received a tax-exempt scholarship of
approximately $42,000 pursuant to the Indian Health Care Improvement
Act and signed an NHSC Scholarship Program standard contract, which
provided for payment of treble damages if he breached his service
obligation. 22 After serving approximately one year and eight months of
his four years of required service, the taxpayer left his approved site in
May of 1989, for reasons not stated in the published decision or the
briefs, 23 and joined a private medical practice. 24 The NHSC declared him
in breach of his contract, and the taxpayer was required to pay the
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") treble damages of
approximately $275,000 (of which $126,000 represented trebled
principal and $149,000 represented trebled deemed interest). 25 On his
income tax return for 1989, the taxpayer deducted all but $42,000 of the
damages, which was the original amount of the scholarship. 26 He
deducted as a business expense $ 84,000, which represented two-thirds
(the trebled portion) of the principal, and also deducted the entire
$149,000 of trebled deemed interest. 27
taxpayer who buys his way out of a noncompete agreement must capitalize the payment under
Treas. Reg. § l .263(a)-4(d)(7)(iii), Example 3. However, the Indopco Regulations generally do not
purport to change the cost recovery rules applicable to the intangibles, which must be capitalized.
Thus, presumably such a payment as in Hawronsky would be amortized under l.R.C. § 167(a)
ratably over the remaining period of the service obligation.
22. Hawronsky v. Comm'r, 105 T.C. 94, 95 (1995), ajf'd, 98 F.3d 1338 (5th Cir. 1996).
23. The taxpayer apparently had a dispute with his employer, but after leaving, he continued
to serve the poor in an underserved area, albeit not one approved by the Indian Health Service.
Telephone Interview with Dr. John Hawronsky (June 29, 1999).
24. Hawronsky, 105 T.C. at 96. In December of that same year the taxpayer accepted other
employment at a hospital for which he received a sign-on bonus of $190,000. Id.
25. Id. at 96.
26. id.
27. See id. at 96-97. Somewhat oddly the taxpayer deducted the "single" imputed interest of
$49,000 as "personal interest," and the $100,000 trebled portion as "mortgage interest." Id.
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The IRS claimed that the payment was not deductible under two
theories. First, because it was a fine or similar penalty subject to l.R.C.
§ 162(f), and second, because it was entirely allocable to income exempt
from tax (the tax-free scholarship) and therefore nondeductible under
1.R.C. § 265(a)(l). 28
The Tax Court held that deduction of the payment was precluded
by l.R.C. § 162(f) on the ground that "[t]he treble damages penalty at
issue here was a penalty imposed on petitioner because he violated his
obligation under [the statute]," and that the "treble damages penalty at
issue here serves a deterrent and a retributive function similar to a
criminal fine." 29 Judge Colvin declined to address the l.R.C. § 265(a)(l)
issue. 30
The Hawronsky decision is vitiated by two issues, which were not
briefed and apparently not even noticed. First, the deemed interest
portion of the single damages is clearly compensatory and therefore
deductible. Second, although the trebled two-thirds of the damages paid
is clearly a penalty, it is a penalty for a breach of contract, not for the
violation of any law, and is thus outside the reach of I.RC. § 162(f).
Therefore, the entire treble damages should have been deductible, except
for the original scholarship amount, just as the taxpayer reported.
In order to explain these errors, it is necessary to give some account
of the history and purpose of I.RC. § 162(f). The account is not
intended to be complete, nor is it intended to be a full-fledged argument
for repeal of I.RC. § 162(f), although a good case might be made that its
enactment was a mistake, and that the earlier judge-made public-policy
doctrine that it replaced was misguided as well. 31

A. History ofI.R.C. § 162(/)
1. Pre-Codification Public Policy Doctrine
The earliest case of denial of a deduction for a business expense on
the ground of public policy seems to be the 1924 decision in Backer v.
Commissioner, 32 in which the Board of Tax Appeals denied a deduction
for the legal expenses of a taxpayer in the construction business who was
28. Id. at 97.
29. Id. at 98-99.
30. See id. at 101.
31. See James W. Colliton, The Tax Treatment of Criminal and Disapproved Payments, 9 VA.
TAX REV. 273 (1989), for an article criticizing both.
32. 1B.T.A.214 (1924).
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defending himself from a charge of perjury relating to the payment of a
bribe extorted from him by labor union bosses. 33 The springboard for
the government's inventive argument was the "ordinary and necessary"
language of the predecessor section of what is now I.R.C. § 162(a). The
government argued that the payment of a bribe, even under extortion,
could never be ordinary or necessary in any business, and the Board
agreed. 34 As the Board saw the matter, "[t]he question is whether the act
whereby [the taxpayer] laid himself open to the charge of perjury was
one which was ordinarily and necessarily committed in the course of his
business. We are unable to see any proximate connection between the
two." 35 Despite the court's statement, the bribe was quite obviously a
business expense paid to avoid labor problems. 36 But the court was not
yet ready to state more honestly - if not more reasonably - that some
genuine business payments should be denied simply because they offend
public policy. Backer was badly reasoned in another respect, which was
not made fully clear until nearly forty years later, when the Supreme
Court decided in Commissioner v. Tellier37 that, guilty or innocent,
everyone has the right to the services of an attorney to defend himself
from criminal charges, and if the charges have a business origin, no
public policy bars deducting the legal expenses. 38 In those forty years
separating Backer and Tellier, the IRS attacked a great variety of
business expenses as allegedly against public policy, and a large body of
inconsistent and controversial case law developed. 39
The dangers and uncertainties of this "public policy" doctrine have
often been pointed out: taxpayers whose behavior displeased judges
would be taxed on a gross rather than a net basis, the limits of the
doctrine would be intolerably uncertain and depend upon the
unpredictable moral opinions of tax court judges, and the denial of
otherwise legitimate deductions would simply add additional penalties
for conduct that may already be punished. 40 Making the punishment fit
33. Id. at215.
34. Id.at216.
35. Id. at 217.
36. Sadly, and ironically, the reason why such bribes are often both ordinary and necessary is
ultimately the government's failure to protect businessmen from extortion.
37. 383 U.S. 687 (1963) (allowing a deduction for legal expenses of unsuccessful defense of
criminal charges of securities fraud).
38. Id. at 694.
39. See BORIS L. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES
AND GIFTS (3d ed. 1999) '1] 20.3.3; see also Jacob L. Todres, Internal Revenue Code Section 162(/):
An Analysis and Its Application to Restitution Payments and Environmental Fines, 99 DICK. L. REV.
645 (1995).
40. Dixie Machine Welding & Metal Works v. United States, 315 F.2d 439, 440-41 (5th Cir.
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the crime is notoriously difficult even for prosecutors, legislators, and
judges whose specialty is law enforcement, and there has never been
much reason to think that tax judges would make any improvement in
this area. 41 Denying deductions on moral grounds has proved more
likely to produce confusion in the tax law than to add anything to the
sum of justice in the world. 42
The objections to denying deductions on the ground of public
policy were very quotably summarized by Judge Bootle in Dixie
Machine Welding & Metal Works v. U.S.:
The object of the income tax bill of 1913 was 'to tax a man's net
income, that is to say, what he has at the end of the year, after
deducting from his receipts his expenditures or losses. It is not to
reform men's moral character; that is not the object of the bill at all.'
'Moral turpitude is a very poor criterion for taxability and * * * in the
interests of good tax administration, Uncle Sam shall take his
taxpayers as he finds them, exact his normal share of their net income,
and let someone specifically charged with he job punish them for their
sins. If the tax collector is required to sit in judgment on the morals of
his clients, he will be doing something for which he has neither the
training nor the knowledge and he will be adding to his already heavy
administrative burdens. Furthermore, uneven and discriminatory
application of the tax laws will result. There are too many different
types and degrees of wickedness, and there are too many different
attitudes toward sin on the part of tax officials and judges.' The
Internal Revenue Code should not be used as a 'mandate for
extirpating evil'; espousal of the public-policy concept would result in
a tax on gross rather than net income, and thus be 'inconsistent with a
code geared to the latter concept'; the public policy which declares a
payment illegal also prescribes stated penalties therefor, and it would
be inconsistent with the policy of the statute to add another penalty loss of a tax deduction - not contemplated thereby; the tax penalty
resulting from disallowance of claimed deductions might be absurdly
disproportionate both to the nature of the offense and to the penalty
therefor prescribed by statute; attempted enforcement by federal tax
authorities of the policy of state statutes would have far reaching
effects, of dubious advantage, on the distribution of law enforcement
powers between the federal and state governments; and the state
statutes or regulations relied upon as expressive of state policy may be
but dead-letter proscriptions, 'nominal, not effective law', and not

1963).
41.
42.

Id.
Id.
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expressive of current community sentiment at all. And not overlooked
is the comment of Mr. Justice Burrough in England nearly a century
and a half ago: 'I, for one, protest, as my Lord has done, against
arguing too strongly upon public policy; - it is a very unruly horse,
and when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry
you. It may lead you from the sound law. It is never argued at all but
when other points fail.' 43

We may add to these observations that even violation of a criminal
statute is not automatically immoral or against the public interest. Only
a nalf would believe all our criminal laws actually serve the public
interest. Consider Peckham v. Commissioner, 44 for example, in which
the taxpayer, a licensed physician, was denied a deduction for his legal
expenses for unsuccessfully defending himself from the criminal charge
of performing an illegal abortion. (Inexplicably, it did the taxpayer no
good to invoke the Supreme Court's 1943 decision in Commissioner v.
Heininger, 45 which allowed the deduction of legal fees incurred by a
licensed dentist in his unsuccessful defense against a fraud order issued
by the Postmaster General forbidding him to sell artificial dentures
through the mail.) The Fourth Circuit explained: "There is no evidence
in the record that the abortion which the taxpayer was charged with
performing had anything to do with his practice of medicine."46 We now
know since the Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Roe v Wade, 47 handed
down only nine years after Peckham, that it was probably not the
taxpayer, but instead (for the time being, at least) the State anti-abortion
law which violated public policy. 48
The leading Supreme Court decision regarding fines and penalties
before the 1969 codification of I.R.C. §162(f), Tank Truck Rentals v.
Commissioner, 49 presented a situation that was almost as ironic. There,
the taxpayer's overweight trucking fines paid for violations of
Pennsylvania highway law were held nondeductible on the theory that
allowing the deductions would "frustrate sharply defined national or
state policies proscribing particular types of conduct,"50 which are
"evidenced by some governmental declaration" (that is to say, evidenced
43. Id. (citations omitted) (denying deduction for payment of illegal kickbacks for ship
repairs, despite delightful rhetoric).
44. 327 F.2.d 855, 857 (4th Cir. 1964), ajf'g40 T.C. 315 (1963).
45. 320 U.S. 467, 474-75 (1943).
46. Peckham, 327 F.2d at 857.
47. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
48. See id.
49. 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
50. Id. at 33-34 (citing Heininger, 320 U.S. at 473).
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by a statute). 51 The Court believed permitting the deduction would
remove some of the sting from the penalty, as indeed it would, at least
for profitable taxpayers. 52 On the other hand, whether reinforcing the
sting was good policy is another matter because the weight law in
question was so unrealistically strict that every trucking company that
transported liquid chemicals was forced to violate it on every trip if it
drove through Pennsylvania at all. 53 The Court was moved by neither
the fact that the offending statute had already been repealed before the
briefs were submitted, nor that the accounting system used by the
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission rate-making authorities treated
the overweight fines as normal business expenses. 54
Eventually, confusion in the area of the "public policy" doctrine
became insupportable, and Congress acted in 1969 to clarify the prior
case law, codify it and make it more predictable. Enactment of I.R.C. §
162(f) in 1969 was part of this general codification.
2. Post-Codification: The Problem of Civil Penalties
Codification of the public-policy doctrine did at least provide some
greater measure of certainty in this hazy area, and it did also generally
follow the most recent Supreme Court decisions. Congress attempted
both to specify which business expense deductions would be disallowed,
and to preempt the field so that the IRS would be prohibited from
denying any others. 55 New I.R.C. § 162(c) would deny deductions for
illegal bribes, kickbacks, and certain other illegal payments, new I.R.C.
§ 162(g) would disallow the non-compensatory two-thirds of anti-trust
treble damage payments, and new I.RC. § 162(f) would deny any
deduction for fines or penalties paid to a govemment56 for the violation
of any law, as in Tank Truck Rentals. These three sections, enacted at

51. Id.
52. Id. Denial of a deduction for fines is a very blunt instrument if the purpose is to enhance
punishments. It may have no effect at all if the taxpayer is in a loss position. And even if the
taxpayer is profitable, the punishment will have no deterrent effect if the fine cannot be avoided in
any event, or if the transaction remains profitable notwithstanding the tax on gross rather than net
income.
53. Id. at 32.
54. Id. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 39.
55. See l.R.C. § I 62(f) (2006).
56. Ostrom v. Comm'r, 77 T.C. 608, 612 (1981). It appears that the only reason a separate
section was required to forbid a deduction for the punitive two-thirds of Clayton Act treble damages
is that the rule applies to damages paid to private plaintiffs, and thus such damages, although for a
"violations of law," are not paid to a government and so not prohibited under l.R.C. § 162(f).
Punitive damages paid to non-governmental plaintiffs remain deductible. Id.
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the same time, were explicitly intended to preempt the field, at least
insofar as the doctrine applies to trade or business deductions. 57 The
Senate Report explained:
The provision added by the committee amendments denies deductions
for four types of expenditures ... The provision for the denial of the
deduction for payments in these situations which are deemed to violate
public policy is intended to be all-inclusive. Public policy, in other
circumstances, generally is not sufficiently clearly defined to justify
the disallowance of deductions. 58

Thus, the damages payment in Hawronsky is either disallowed as a
deduction under the specific terms of I.R.C. § 162(f), or it is allowable
despite any possible misgivings about public policy. 59
As the Senate Finance Committee Report explained the codification
of new l.R.C. § 162(f), it seemed to limit the disallowance of fines and
penalties to purely criminal matters:
First, the committee amendments provide that no deduction is to be
allowed for any fine or similar penalty paid to a government for the
violation of any law. This provision is to apply in any case in which
the taxpayer is required to pay a fine because he is convicted of a crime
(penalty or misdemeanor) in a full criminal proceeding in an
appropriate court. This represents a codification of the general court

57. The statutory preemption by its terms applies only to expenses, as opposed to otherwise
deductible losses under I.R.C. § 165. On the other hand, it appears that courts are willing to use the
principles of l.R.C. § 162(f) to determine whether a loss should be disallowed on public policy
grounds. See Stephens v. Comm'r, 905 F.2d 667, 672 (2d Cir. 1990). Properly speaking, a loss
from a transaction, as opposed to an overall loss from operations, implicitly involves only a loss
from property, not an expenditure of money. See SHEPHERD'S TAX DICTIONARY 341 (Richard A.
Westin ed., Shepard's/McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1990). Thus Hawronsky's cash buyout of his employment
contract should be treated as an expense rather than a loss (unless, as noted above, it must be
capitalized under the new Indopco Regulations). However, the expense would probably be
capitalized and deducted over its useful life. See infra Part II.
58. S. REP. No. 91-552, at 274 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2311.
59. Unless the IRS and the courts simply ignore the statutory preemption, as may have
happened in Hawronsky v. Comm'r, 105 T.C. 94 (1995), aff'd, 98 F.3d 1338 (5th Cir. 1996). See
Robert R. Wood, Denying Deductions Based on Public Policy, TAX NOTES, March 27, 2006, at
1415, which points out that in Car-Ron Asphalt Paving Co. v. Commissioner, 758 F.2d 1132 (6th
Cir. 1985), a deduction was denied for a kickback paid by a subcontractor to a general contractor
that was legal under Ohio law, in clear violation of the requirement under I.R.C. § 162(c)(2) that the
kickback can only be denied a deduction if it is illegal under state law. The court's reasoning was
that the kickback was neither "ordinary" nor "necessary." Car-Ron, 758 F.2d at 1134. This
decision is eerily reminiscent of Backer v. Commissioner, I B.T.A. 214 (1924), the very first of the
public-policy decisions. The law of Car-Ron is the same as that in 1924, and perhaps the freefloating public-policy doctrine simply cannot be killed, even by Congress.
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position in this respect. 60

After the enactment of I.RC. § l 62(f), doubt immediately arose as
to whether the new provision was to apply solely to fines for criminal
violations of law, as the above-quoted Senate Report indicated with its
"convicted of a crime" language, or whether the new statutory phrase
"fines or similar penalties" might extend to civil penalties as well, and
in particular to the vast array of tax penalties and additions to tax. Some
civil tax penalties had been disallowed under case law prior to the
enactment of I.R.C. § 162(f), notably the penalty for negligent
understatement of tax, 61 the civil fraud penalty, 62 and the 100 per cent
penalty for willfully failing to collect a tax (predecessor of I.RC. §
6672). If, as the Senate Report indicated, the new provision was
intended to codify existing law, then should it not apply to these civil tax
penalties as well, despite the same Report's explicit limitation to
criminal fines and penalties?
Two years later, using the occasion of Congress' unrelated
amendment of I.R.C. § 162(c) in Revenue Act of 1971, the Senate
Finance Committee attempted to clarify matters by adding a
supplementary explanation:
In connection with the proposed regulations relating to the
disallowance of deductions for fines and similar penalties (section
162(f)), questions have also been raised as to whether the provision
applies only to criminal "penalties" or also to civil penalties as well.
In approving the provisions dealing with fines and similar penalties in
1969, it was the intention of the committee to disallow deductions for
payments of sanctions which are imposed under civil statutes but
which in general terms serve the same purpose as a fine exacted under
a criminal statute. The provision was intended to apply, for example,
to penalties provided for under the Internal Revenue Code in the form
of assessable penalties (subchapter B of chapter 68) as well as to
additions to tax under the Internal Revenue laws (subchapter A of
chapter 68) in those cases where the government has the fraud burden
of proof (i.e., proof by clear and convincing evidence). It was also
intended that this rule should a£ply to similar payments under the laws
of a State or other jurisdiction.

The Report went on to explain that:
60. S. REP. No. 91-552 at 274.
61. United States v. Jaffray, 97 F.2d 488, 494 (8th Cir. 1938), afj"d on another issue sub
nom., United States v. Bertelsen & Petersen Eng'g Co., 306 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1939).
62. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
63. S. REP. No. 92-437 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1918, 1979-80.
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On the other hand, it was not intended that deductions be denied in the
case of sanctions imposed to encourage prompt compliance with
requirements of law. Thus, many jurisdictions impose "penalties" to
encourage prompt compliance with filing or other requirements which
are really more in the nature of late filing charges or interest charges
than they are fines. It was not intended that this type of sanction be
disallowed under the 1969 action. Basically, in this area, the
committee did not intend to liberalize the law in the case of fines and
. 64
penal ties.

Despite this explanation, the final regulations under I.R.C. § 162(f)
ignored the Senate Committee's distinctions as they might apply to tax
penalties, and disallowed any deduction for all penalties and additions to
tax, no matter what the burden of proof might be, and without regard for
whether the nature of the penalty indicates some degree of negligence or
culpability, or is merely a late filing or late payment charge. 65
Notwithstanding the criminal-only application of I.RC. § 162(f)
described in the Senate Report's 1969 explanation, it is firmly
established that any civil penalty, not just civil tax penalties, may fall
within the ambit of the language "fine or similar penalty" in I.R.C. §
162(f) if it serves the same purpose as a fine imposed under a criminal
statute. This is also in accordance with pre-enactment case law. 66
3. What Does "Similar Penalty" Mean?
The Treasury has never contended that compensatory damages are
governed by I.RC. § 162(f) and its regulations hold flatly to the
contrary.
Treasury Regulation § 1.162-21(b)(2) clearly states in
pertinent part that "[c]ompensatory damages ... paid to a government do
not constitute a fine or penalty." 67 However, distinguishing civil
penalties intended to deter or punish from compensatory damages paid
to a government has proved to be a very difficult problem. In fact,
nearly all the reported litigation under I.R.C. § 162(t) concerns this

64. Id.
65. See Treas. Reg.§ l.162-2l(b)(ii) (1975) (disallowing deduction of all federal tax penalties
and additions to tax).
66. See, e.g., A. D. Juilliard & Co., Inc. v. Johnson, 259 F.2d 837, 844 (2d Cir. 1958) (finding
treble damages for Emergency Price Control Act civil penalty not deductible); McGraw-Edison Co.
v. United States, 300 F.2d 453, 456 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (holding there is no deduction for payment to the
United States in a settlement of breach of agreement providing "penalty" for employing child
labor); Tunnel R.R. of St. Louis v. Comm'r, 61F.2d166, 174-75 (8th Cir. 1932) (finding that civil
penalties under Safety Appliance Act are not deductible).
67. Treas. Reg.§ l.162-2l(b)(2).

142

AKRON TAX JOURNAL

(22:129

issue, and Hawronsky is no exception. 68 The inclusion of civil penalties
within the ambit of I.R.C. § 162(t) thus undercut Congress' goal of
simplifying the law, and was clearly a mistake to the extent that
simplification was the principal goal of the 1969 codifications.
The leading case in the Tax Court is Southern Pacific Railroad v.
Commissioner, 69 which held that civil penalties imposed for the purpose
of enforcing the law and punishing violators are "similar" to a criminal
fine within the meaning of I.R.C. § 162(t), and that civil penalties
intended to encourage prompt compliance with the law, or to provide
remedial compensation for losses resulting from a violation, are not
"similar." 70 Whether the purpose of a penalty is to enforce and punish is
the relevant question according to Southern Pacific, and not whether the
punished conduct is of itself reprehensible or merely a regulatory
infraction. 71 Where a penalty serves a dual purpose of law enforcement
and retribution as well as compensation, the Tax Court has held that it
must determine the primary purpose of the penalty, principally by
analysis of the statute under which the penalty (or damages) is
imposed. 72 It is often far from obvious where lines should be drawn,
usually because all such payments at least arguably have some elements
of both characters. In apparent frustration at the difficulty of this inquiry
the Federal Circuit gave up the attempt altogether in the isolated
decision Colt Industries, Inc. v. United States, 73 and declined to consider
the remedial vel punitive purpose of the environmental penalties at issue,
stating that the "purpose" inquiry is not prescribed either by statute or
regulations, and that it is not the role of the judiciary to make its own

68. 105 T.C. 94 (1995), ajf'd, 98 F.3d 1338 (5th Cir. 1996).
69. 75 T.C. 497, 646-54 (1980) (holding that penalties incurred in 1959, 1960, and 1961, for
violations of the Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, and the Twenty-Eight Hour Act, 45
U.S.C. §§ 71-74, were imposed to enforce the law, to punish violations thereof, and to fall within
the scope of the term "fine or similar penalty" in I.R.C. § 162(f), where such violations were
nondeductible under both prior judicial law and l.R.C. § 162(f)).
70. Southern Pacific 75 T.C. at 652.
71. Id. (finding that many of the violations were unavoidable and very common in the
industry).
72. S & B Rest., Inc. v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 1226, 1232 (1980) (discussing the dual purpose of
the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law as punishing illegal discharges and developing pollution
control, and finding that the agreed-to particular payments at issue were not penalties in part
because the amounts were open-ended and based upon charges petitioner would have had to pay if a
municipal sewage facility had been available).
73. 880 F.2d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (denying a deduction for $1.6 million paid to
Pennsylvania Clean Air and Clean Water Funds pursuant to a consent decree and a settlement
agreement of suit brought by the Environmental Protection Agency for multiple violations of the
Clean Air and Clean Water Acts).
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assessment of the deductibility of a particular penalty. 74 This approach
would have left the issue of deductibility entirely to the discretion of the
IRS. Colt Industries has not been followed by other courts, however,
which continue to apply the "purpose" test set forth in Southern
Pacific. 75
The parties themselves may determine the characterization of a
penalty by their own settlement agreement. 76 For example, in Middle
Atlantic Distributors, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 a payment in settlement of
penalties and damages under 19 U.S.C. § 1592 for fraudulent violations
of customs laws was held deductible because, after determining that the
statute was a dual-purpose one, the Tax Court decided that the parties'
characterization of the payment as "liquidated damages" must be given
tax effect. 78 Similarly, in Grossman & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 79
where the taxpayers characterized their settlement offer, which was
accepted by the government, as "contractual damages," a deduction for
the amount paid was held not to be against public policy. 80 This despite
the fact that the government's suit was for civil fines and double
damages under the False Claims Act, 81 and that the taxpayers had
already been criminally convicted and fined under related provisions for
the same conduct. 82 On the other hand, the total amount of the
settlement was apparently far less than the government's "single"
damages. 83
74. Id. at 1314.
75. Stephens v. Comm'r, 905 F.2d 667, 672-73 (2d Cir. 1990).
76. Middle Atlantic Distribs., Inc. v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 1136, 1146 (1979).
77. 72 T.C. 1136 (allowing the taxpayer to deduct a settlement of $100,000 for violating
customs laws by fraudulently withdrawing liquor from its warehouse without paying required
import duties and alcohol taxes).
78. Id. at 1146.
79. 48 T.C. 15 (1967) (finding that amounts paid in a settlement of a government suit under
the False Claims Act for penalties and double damages for fraudulently mislabeling and overbilling
the Navy were deductible because the taxpayer characterized the offer, which was accepted by the
government, as "contractual damages").
80. Id. at 29.
81. 31 u.s.c. §§ 3729-3731 (2006).
82. Grossman, 48 T.C. at 18.
83. Id. at 22. In a remarkably similar case, Talley Industries Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C.M.
(CCH) 2191 (1999), where the parties had not indicated whether $940,000 of a $2.5 million
settlement was intended as compensation or as penalty under the False Claims Act, the taxpayer was
unable to shoulder his burden of proof that the disputed $940,000 was not in lieu of penalties, and
was denied a deduction. The remaining $1.56 million of the settlement was the Navy's estimate of
its own actual "singles" losses, not including the government's investigatory expenses. Id. The
government had never tried to establish the exact amount of its losses and relied on projections and
estimates based on false billing in 1984. Id. In the Tax Court's first decision, 68 T.C.M. (CCH)
1412 (1994), the taxpayer was allowed to deduct the entire $2.5 million on the ground that the
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Other factors that have been considered in determining whether a
given exaction is predominantly compensatory in nature are whether the
payment is structured so that the amount increases in proportion to the
harm done, 84 whether the exactions are used for remediation of the harm,
and whether liability is strictly imposed. Oddly enough, liability without
fault has sometimes triggered the tax punishment. 85 The courts have not
had an easy time sifting these various factors.

B. NHSC Treble Damages: Penalty or Compensation?
The Tax Court cited many of the above decisions in Hawronsky,
but did not attempt to apply their precepts with any rigorous argument. 86
Instead, it held for the government, with the conclusory announcement
that the NHSC liquidated damages are a nondeductible penalty because
"[t]he treble damages amount has no demonstrated relationship to the
cost imposed on the Government of replacing petitioner's services. " 87
The Tax Court suggested that Congress intended the treble damages to
be punitive by quoting a somewhat cryptic statement from the legislative
history of the 1975 changes to the NHSC scholarship program, which
trebled the damages for breach of the service obligation, according to
which the NHSC "is not intended... solely to subsidize health
professional education, 'but as a means to overcome a geographic
misdistribution of health professionals. "'88 Despite its cursoriness, the
Tax Court was correct on both counts, and so was its conclusion that the
treble damages are a penalty and not compensatory.
Both the
replacement cost and "maldistribution penalty" arguments are discussed
below in the following sections.
Most of the Tax Court's opinion was devoted not to these
settlement was far less than double damages, and there was no evidence that any of the amount was
intended as a penalty. The Ninth Circuit, 116 F.3d 382, 388 (9th Cir. 1997), reversed and remanded
to determine the purpose for which the $940,000 excess over the Navy's estimate of its actual
damages was paid.
84. Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc. v. United States, 708 F.2d 1043, 1047 (6th Cir. 1983)
(examining liquidated damages for a trucking company's violation of Virginia weight laws and
holding the damages deductible where they were determined by degree to which weight exceeded
the legal limits, and where separate sanction of nondeductible fines were also applicable).
85. True v. United States, 894 F.2d 1197, 1210 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that the penalty paid
for discharge of oil in violation of Federal Water Pollution Control Act is not deductible and
reversing the district court's holding that the penalty was primarily compensatory because
assessments were used to defray cleanup costs and because strict liability was intended to shift fault
to the party best able to bear cost and insure risk).
86. Hawronsky v. Comm'r, 105 T.C. 94 (1995), ajf'd, 98 F.3d 1338 (5th Cir. 1996).
87. Id. at 99.
88. Id. at 99-100 (quoting S. REP. 94-887, at 201 (1975)).

2007]

TREBLE DAMAGES FOR NHSC CONTRACTS

145

arguments, but rather to discrediting the taxpayer's reliance on
seemingly airtight authorities imported from a non-tax area, namely
contract law. 89 The question in these cases was whether under contract
law the NHSC treble damages are enforceable in the first place, or
whether they constitute an unenforceable penalty. 90 The taxpayer relied
upon four Federal District Court decisions, 91 which appear precisely on
point and held that the NHSC treble damages are not a penalty, but
rather compensatory in nature. The NHSC scholarship participants in
these cases resisted enforcement on the ground (among many other
grounds) that the treble damages were so excessive as to be
unenforceable under the common law doctrine disfavoring penalty
clauses in contracts. 92 All of these decisions held for the government,
however, and found that the damages were compensatory in nature and
therefore valid and enforceable liquidated damages. 93
In United States v. Swanson, 94 the first of these decisions, the
District Court found that the harm suffered by the government from loss
of the physician's services is not limited to the actual monies expended.
The court explained that:
To estimate the damages which would be suffered by the loss of
services of a trained ...physician for a three year period in a medically
underserved area is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately determine.
The Court cannot say that [the treble] damages which the government
[is] entitled to receive for Defendant's breach of the contract bears no
relation to the actual damages suffered by the government, or that they
were not a fair and reasonable attempt to fix just compensation in the
95
event ofbreach.

The Swanson court then held in summary judgment for the
government that the liquidated damages clause was valid and
enforceable as a reasonable estimate of probable damages, which are
difficult to predict. 96 Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States91 held that the

89. See Hawronsky, 105 T.C. 94.
90. Id. at 98-99.
91. United States v. Swanson, 618 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D. Mich. 1985); United States v. Hayes,
633. F. Supp. 1183 (M.D.N.C. 1986); United States v. Fowler, 659 F. Supp. 624 (N.D. Cal. 1987),
affd, 849 F.2d 1476 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Padavano, 664 F. Supp. 28 (D. Me. 1987).
92. Hawronsky, 105 T.C. at 100.
93. See Swanson, 618 F. Supp. at 1244; see also Hayes, 633. F. Supp. at 1187; Fowler, 659 F.
Supp. at 625; Padavano, 664 F. Supp. at 30.
94. 618 F. Supp. 1231.
95. Id. at 1243-44.
96. Id. at 1243 (citing Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947)).
97. Priebe, 332 U.S. 407.
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same standards that applied to contracts with private parties applied to
contracts with the government, namely that liquidated damages clauses
that are not intended to be in terrorem penalties to compel performance
are enforceable when they are fair and reasonable attempts to fix just
compensation in advance for anticipated losses. 98
The Swanson decision was soon followed in at least three other
District Court decisions in three other circuits. 99 If the government's
losses include the harm to the underserved community deprived of the
promised medical care, as the Swanson Court suggested, the harm is
clearly impossible of measurement even ex post, much less ex ante, and
might easily exceed the triple damages by far.
These District Court precedents would seem to guarantee the
taxpayer victory. The NHSC stipulated payments for nonperformance
are labeled damages by Congress, 100 compensatory damages are
deductible according to the Treasury Regulations, and the federal courts
had universally held these same damages to be compensatory rather than
punitive, finding them a classic case for the appropriate use of
enforceable liquidated damages. The taxpayer in Hawronsky lost
nevertheless.
1. Opportunism in the Government's Litigating Position(s)
There is considerable opportunism in the government's
contradictory positions. The very same NHSC treble damages are
claimed to be "punitive" when that benefits the government under the
tax law, but "compensatory" if that benefits the government under
contract law.
There is no obvious reason to suppose that
"compensatory" and "punitive" ought to mean anything different for
purposes of I.RC. § l 62(f) than for the interpretation of contracts, and in
fact they do not. In both areas of law, the test is essentially the same:
whether the amount of stipulated damages is a reasonable attempt to
approximate probable damages in advance, or whether the amount is so
much greater than any actual or reasonably expected damages that the
clause is clearly intended to coerce performance by threat of
punishment. 101
The only differences are those of the realm of
98. Id. However, the Court held the particular clause at issue to be an unenforceable penalty
because under it the government was incapable of suffering any loss at all. Id. at 413.
99. United States v. Hayes, 633. F. Supp. 1183 (M.D.N.C. 1986); United States v. Fowler,
659 F. Supp. 624 (N.D. Cal. 1987), ajf'd, 849 F.2d 1476 (9th Cir. 1988); and United States v.
Padavano, 664 F. Supp. 28 (D. Me. 1987).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 254o(b)(l)(B)(i)-(iii) (2006).
IOI. Hawronsky v. Comm'r, 105 T.C. 94, 98 (1995), ajf'd, 98 F.3d 1338 (5th Cir. 1996).
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application: the common-law unenforceability doctrine is of course
limited to contracts, and the denial of a tax deduction is limited to
penalties paid to a government, and most importantly for Hawronsky,
penalties paid "for the violation of any law." 102
The Tax Court seemed to accept this identity of meaning in contract
and tax law, but was nevertheless unmoved by the Swanson line of
cases. 103 It announced as a conclusion that "[t]he treble damages penalty
serves a deterrent and a retributive function similar to a criminal fine,"
and then explained that Swanson and its progeny cited by the taxpayer
were "unpersuasive here because they were decided before Courts of
Appeal for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits held that statutory intent and not
contract principles govern the parties' obligations under 42 U.S.C. 2540
and that Congress intended treble damages imposed under 42 U.S.C. sec.
2540 to be an enforceable civil penalty." 104
A closer look at the Circuit Court decisions cited by Judge Colvin
does not entirely bear out this interpretation. Nothing in these Circuit
Court holdings directly contradicts or reverses the District Courts'
unanimous conclusion that the treble damages are compensatory
liquidated damages. Instead, they render the whole question irrelevant
by holding that common law contract principles, such as the common
law disfavor of penalty clauses, simply do not apply to NHSC contracts
because Congress decreed by statute that the triple damages must be
enforced unless it would be impossible or unconscionable to do so. 105
Judge Colvin cited Rendleman v. Bowen, 106 United States v.
Hatcher, 107 United States v. Citrin, 108 United States v. Arron, 109 and

102. Id. at 97.
103. See id. at 100.
104. Id. at 99-100.
105. Id. at IOI.
106. 860 F.2d 1537 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding a participant who left his residency program
without notice to NHSC, failed to match to a site on HPOL, and practiced in a poverty area of
Portland, Oregon without the permission ofNHSC, but who believed he was in compliance with his
service obligation, was in default for refusing to report to NHSC's placement for him in Evergreen,
Alabama, despite the fact that in the following year the site of his Portland practice was designated a
qualifying HPSA location). The court determined that Congress intended participants to comply
with procedures delegated to NHSC, and that NHSC followed its procedures. Id. The District
Court remanded to the NHSC to determine whether a waiver for time served was warranted.
Rendlemen v. Sullivan, 760 F. Supp. 842 (D. Or. 1991), rev'd sub nom., Rendleman v. Shalala, 21
F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1994).
107. 922 F.2d 1402 (9th Cir. 1991) (following Rendleman, and determining that whether a
participant osteopath is in default should be determined not by contract principles, but under the
Administrative Procedure Act; and finding the NHSC preference for residency-trained physicians
not arbitrary or capricious and the failure to disclose this preference did not stop the government
from enforcing damage clause).
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United States v. Melendez, 110 for the proposition that statutory principles,
not contract principles, apply to the NHSC program. The Ninth Circuit
in Rendleman was the first to announce this doctrine, reversing the
District Court below, which had held for the NHSC participant on the
ground that the NHSC had abused its authority by unreasonably refusing
to credit Rendleman for his service in an area that should have been
approved as a HMSA. 111 The Ninth Circuit reversed on the ground that
Congress had granted the NHSC sole authority to designate shortage
areas, and Rendleman had not complied with the NHSC procedures for
placement. 112 Despite its holding for the government, the court was
visibly disturbed by the fact that Rendleman had set up a huge practice
in a poverty area that had twice as great a shortage of physicians as the
average HMSA, and that Rendleman had repeatedly tried without
success to persuade the NHSC to designate the area of his practice as a
HMSA. 113 The Ninth Circuit remanded with the suggestion that the
District Court refer the case back to the NHSC for reconsideration of
whether Rendleman should be given credit for his service. 114 The matter
was sent back to the NHSC, which again refused to waive the treble

108. 972 F.2d 1044 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying legislative intent standard and not contract
principles; finding that NHSC did not repudiate contract for alleged change of policy by disallowing
deferral of service to in order to complete anesthesiology residency where participant failed to
submit required request to NHSC; and finding that participant's due process rights were not violated
by the magnitudeo of damages).
109. 954 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying legislative intent standard and not contract
principles). In Arron, the court found that NHSC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by allegedly
failing to mail the recipient forms that were required to request deferment. Id. The court further
found that remanding to NHSC is not required to consider a waiver for time served on the ground
that the participant was practicing in a Louisiana hospital that NHSC designated an HPOL site a
year after participant refused to go to the Texas assignment. Id. NHSC has the discretion to
determine waiver for "extreme hardship or good cause shown" under 42 U.S.C. § 254o(c)(3)
(2006), a provision that is applicable only to the loan repayment program under 42 U.S.C. §
2540(1)-l - the applicable waiver provision for the scholarship program is at 42 U.S.C. §
2540( d)(2). Id. Here, the participant made none of these showings. Id.
110. 944 F.2d 216, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding contract principles irrelevant following
Rendleman and that a participant did not qualify for waiver where he was discharged from approved
service site in Texas and thus unemployed for one and one-half months while NHSC sought a new
site, he made no claim under Administrative Procedure Act, and he provided no evidence that
refusing to report to new assignment was due to impossibility or extreme hardship which would
qualify for waiver under 42 U.S.C. § 254o(d)(2)).
111. Rendleman, 860 F.2d at 1544.
112. Id.
113. The NHSC did finally qualify the area as a HMSA, but it refused to assign Rendleman to
the practice he had built in Portland, Oregon. Id. It instead ordered him to Alabama, where he
refused to go, and then held Rendleman in default. Id.
114. Id.
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damages. 115 Rendleman resisted again, and again the District Court
referred the case back to the NHSC for reconsideration. 116 This is the
end of the reported litigation, and Rendleman apparently succeeded in
avoiding payment. 117 Ironically, Rendleman, which first established the
doctrine that participants have no rights to common law contract
defenses such as partial performance, is also the only case in which a
participant ever succeeded in avoiding the treble damages despite having
defied the NHSC's orders and served the poor in his own manner and
according to his own judgment. 118
The Ninth Circuit's Rendleman doctrine held that no common law
contract defenses such as unconscionability, economic duress, partial
performance or estoppel apply to NHSC contracts 119 because Congress
itself set forth the only defenses to breach of an NHSC contract, either
explicitly or by delegation to HHS, 120 so that NHSC decisions are
reviewable only as claims under the Administrative Procedure Act. 121
After Rendleman, it is no longer relevant to the enforceability of NHSC
damages whether they are a penalty or not, at least in the Fifth Circuit
(to which Hawronsky was appealable) and in the Ninth Circuit. 122 But
even assuming that Rendleman was correctly decided, 123 it did not
overrule or disapprove Swanson's holding that the NHSC treble
damages are compensatory. 124
Contrary to what the Tax Court suggested, a large number of post115. Rendleman v. Sullivan, 760 F. Supp. 842, 844 (D. Ore. 1991), rev'd sub nom., Rendleman
v. Shalala, 21F.3d957 (9th Cir. 1994).
116. Id. at 846.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Rendleman, 860 F.2d at 1542; United States v. Hatcher, 922 F.2d 1402, 1405 (9th Cir.
1991); see also United States v. Westerband-Garcia, 35 F.3d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Bloom, 112 F.3d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1997).
120. The regulations implementing the 42 U .S.C. § 2540( d)(2) statutory standard for waiver for
impossibility, extreme hardship or unconscionability are at 42 C.F.R. § 62.12 (2006).
121. See Hatcher, 922 F.2d at 1405.
122. Rendleman, 860 F.2d at 1542.
123. The Rendleman doctrine is by no means self-evidently correct, and it has been questioned.
See Illinois Dept of Public Health v. Jackson, 747 N.E.2d 474 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (reversing and
remanding circuit's imposition of treble damages for court to determine, inter a/ia, whether a
participant in Illinois medical scholarship program similar to NHSC that practiced in poverty area
without approval of agency deserved credit for time served as equivalent to "substantial
performance"). The Jackson majority declined to follow the Rendleman line of cases, and pointedly
asked "If the government chooses to enter into contracts with an individual, why should the
individual be subject to the law of contracts, but the government not be?" Id. at 4 78. But see Dept.
of Public Health v. Wiley, 810 N.E.2d 614 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (adopting the Rendleman doctrine
and rejecting Jackson).
124. See United States v. Swanson, 618 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
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Rendleman decisions continued to cite Swanson for the proposition that
the treble damages are compensatory, and no federal enforcement
decision rejects the Swanson doctrine. 125 For example, in United States
v. Vanhorn, 126 the participant claimed, inter alia, that the treble damages
The Fourth Circuit disagreed, quoting
were "unconscionable."
127
Swanson.
Other post-Rendleman decisions approving Swanson on the
penalty question include United States v. Hugelmeyer, 128 United States
v. Turner, 129 and United States v. Maldonado. 130
On the other hand, universal approval and constant repetition is no
guarantee that the Swanson doctrine is correct. Swanson was decided on
motion for summary judgment, and the penalty issue was but one of
fives issues decided. 131 It was treated in cursory fashion, and no facts or
legal analysis whatsoever were adduced to support the conclusion that
the government's losses were either incapable of proof or that the treble
damages were a reasonable attempt to estimate the government's
expected damages. 132 The decisions following Swanson on the penalty
issue simply quoted Swanson, and made no analysis either. 133 The
Swanson line of cases seems clearly wrong for several reasons, which
were not considered in any of the reported enforcement litigation. 134
First, the measure of damages for breach of an employment
contract (assuming the NHSC contract is one) is the replacement cost of
the employee. Second, the NHSC does not, as a general rule, replace
125. Rendleman, 860 F.2d at 1542.
126. 20 F.3d 104 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding that there was no agency action to review since the
participant never sought a waiver and that contract defenses such as substantial compliance and
estoppel were irrelevant to NHSC contracts). In Vanhorn, the participant practiced without written
NHSC approval in Anacostia, D.C., which was adjacent to a designated HPSA, believing that the
site was approved. Id. She claimed she never received required application forms from NHSC, but
was still held in default. Id. Her later refusal to report to Amarillo, Texas under a forbearance
agreement was her second default. Id. The participant's third default was her failure to apply for an
appropriate site under a second forbearance agreement. Id. Participant's arguments ultimately
failed because she did not advance any claim of abuse of discretion under the AP A and never sought
a waiver from NHSC. Id.
127. Id. at 113 (quoting Swanson, 618 F. Supp. at 1243-44); see also supra note 65.
128. 774 F. Supp. 559, 561 (D. Ariz. 1991) (acknowledging and approving the statutoryinterpretation theory of Rendleman, but stating that regardless of the statutory language it would
address the participant's affirmative defenses, including the defense that the damages were
unenforceable as a penalty, but nonetheless denying this defense pursuant to Swanson).
129. 660 F. Supp. 1323 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (making the same finding as Hugelmeyer).
130. 867 F. Supp. 1184 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (making the same finding as both Hugelmeyer and
Turner, but without mentioning the Rendleman doctrine).
131. See Swanson, 618 F. Supp. 1231.
132. See id. at 1242-44.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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defaulters, and when it does so, it is solely through its internal programs
at the same cost as it paid the defaulter, that is, the scholarship amount.
Third, most defaulters are not NHSC employees in the first place. The
actual on-site employer (if any) can hardly have any rights under
scholarship contracts entered into years before any particular employer
or site could have been contemplated by the parties. For the same reason,
the public to be served at any particular site can have no rights under the
scholarship contract. And finally, the legislative history of the treble
damages, the corresponding penalties (or lack of any) in State programs
similar or identical to the federal programs under the NHSC, and the
actual behavior of the NHSC itself, all point unmistakably to the
conclusion that the treble damages are and are intended to be a
punishment.
The reader who is interested solely in tax law may safely skip all
these issues and pick up at section C infra.
2. Replacement Costs
Under contract law generally, the proper measure of an employer's
loss from an employee's breach of contract is the cost of finding a
substitute, as the Tax Court correctly suggested in Hawronsky. 135 A
stipulated damages cause for an employee's breach of contract may also
include additional consequential damages not otherwise allowable and
still be enforceable, but only if such consequential damages are
reasonable in amount, and if the parties clearly contemplated and
negotiated the stipulated damages clause with such consequential
damages in mind. 136 The Sixth Circuit's decision in Vanderbilt
University v. DiNardo 137 provides a well-reasoned modem account of
the law regarding a stipulated damages clause in an employment
contract, which bears some similarities to the damages clause in a NHSC
contract. 138 In Vanderbilt, the head football coach resigned before the
end of his five-year contract, and Vanderbilt successfully enforced a
liquidated damages clause that required DiNardo to pay to Vanderbilt an
amount equal to his base salary for each year remaining on his
135.
1996).
136.
137.
138.

See Hawronsky v. Comm'r, 105 T.C. 94, 100-101 (1995), ajf'd, 98 F.3d 1338 (5th Cir.

Vanderbilt Univ. v. Dinardo, 174 F.3d 751, 756 (6th Cir. 1999).
Id.
See Gregory Scott Crespi, Measuring "Actual Hann" for the Purpose of Determining the
Enforceability of Liquidated Damages Clauses, 41 Hous. L. REV. 1579, 1601-03 (2005); 11
ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 58.7 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. Supp.
2005).
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contract. 139 DiNardo resisted payment on the ground that the clause was
an unenforceable penalty, but the District Court below enforced the
clause on summary judgment on the ground that the provision was
reasonable in relation to the anticipated damages for breach, measured
prospectively at the time the contract was entered into. 140 These
anticipated damages included consequential damages not ordinarily
In
awarded by law because the parties contemplated them. 141
Vanderbilt, the court noted that the contract itself recited the importance
of a "long-term commitment" for "the University's desire for a stable
intercollegiate football program," and accepted Vanderbilt's explanation
that it was impossible to estimate how the loss of a head coach might
affect alumni relations, public support, football ticket sales, and the
like. 142 The contract had been negotiated by lawyers, and the liquidated
damages clause was reciprocal. 143 In addition, Vanderbilt presented
evidence that its actual expenses for recruiting a new coach, including
the new coach's moving expenses, and the incremental salary it had to
pay, were very nearly equal to the amount claimed under the liquidated
damages clause. 144
None of the conditions are present in an NHSC contract that might
indirectly permit, as in Vanderbilt, allowing consequential damages over
and above simple replacement cost. The NHSC contract recites nothing
about any (otherwise noncompensable) consequential or unforeseeable
harm as the reason for the enormous amount of stipulated damages, and
in fact provides no reason at all for the treble damages. 145 The terms of
the NHSC contact are obviously not negotiated on equal terms at arms
length; they are not negotiated at all. The student who participates must
take or leave the government's contract as it stands. 146

139. Vanderbilt, 174 F.3d at 753-54.
140. Id. at 755.
141. Id. at 755-56.
142. Id. at 756
143. Id. at 757.
144. Id.
145. Of course, the NHSC damages clause has nothing reciprocal about it either, nor has the
government ever even tried to prove any consequential losses over and above its investment in the
contract. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 254o(b)(l)(A) (2006).
146. The student undoubtedly assumes that when the time for service comes, the NHSC
administrators will be reasonable and supportive in helping him to select a proper site for his service
obligation, and that the treble damages clause could never apply to him as long as he is willing to
serve the poor. He overlooks entirely that he has signed away any real choice of his own, and that
he has written a blank check to the NHSC to enforce its own desires. For NHSC contract
provisions, see Stroud v. United States, 906 F. Supp. 990, 991 (D.S.C. 1995), vacated on other
grounds, 94 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1996).
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It may be questioned on several grounds whether even the general
rule of cost-of-substitute-employee should be considered the standard of
reasonableness for NHSC damages. First, less than ten per cent of
NHSC physicians are actually employees of the government. 147 The vast
majority are employed by a hospital or clinic, or are self-employed. In
most instances the NHSC role is limited to facilitating a match between
a participant and an employer at the site, and the actual terms of
employment are negotiated by the parties themselves. The NHSC neither
trains nor pays these participants.
Second, in actual practice, the NHSC does not replace defaulting
physicians except from within the Corps itself, 148 either through the
scholarship program, or through the related Loan Repayment Program
(LRP), which will be described below. If no replacement from the
Corps is found (or sought 149), the position simply remains unfilled. The
NHSC never replaces a physician by paying whatever the market price
might be, and it is doubtful whether the NHSC has the authority to do so
if it wanted. Under these circumstances, the proper measure of
replacement cost should probably not be based upon the experience of
other employers who might pay the market price for primary-care
physicians, because such costs will never be borne by the government.
The inquiry must be focused on the expected replacement costs that the
government might actually bear. 150
The Swanson Court assumed that no such evidence is available, and
made no attempt to discover any. 151
It restated as a fact the
government's assertions that "a physician.. .is not a 'fungible
handyman'" and that "the loss of the services of a trained osteopathic
physician .. .is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately determine." 152
This seems almost comical in view of the fact that the NHSC service
commitment is designed strictly for beginners who are straight out of
internship or residency and are unlikely to possess unique expertise.
Indeed, the NHSC program generally forbids extending even residency

147. Telephone Interview with Pauline Cooper, Chief of Compliance, NHSC, in Rockville,
Md. (June 29, 1999). The government-employed physicians are mainly in the Indian Health Corps,
or federal prisons. Id.
148. Id.
149. A replacement might not be sought at all because the NHSC considers other sites a higher
priority or, in some cases, because the number of defaulters at a site persuades the NHSC that the
site management is poor. Telephone Interview with Dr. Don Weaver, Director, NHSC, in
Rockville, Md. (Nov. 4, 2004).
150. See generally United States v. Swanson, 618 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1243-44.
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training for more than three years, or in fields other than primary care. 153
The services of one new graduate should probably be considered no
more valuable than those of another, and in any case, issues of
differential compensation are either left to negotiation between the site
employer and the participant, or, in the rare case of direct employment
by the government, are governed by a fixed civil service pay scale,
which belies as a matter of law any differential value between beginners
at the same level. 154 If we can put aside the "uniqueness" issue as
spurious, good evidence of actual replacement costs appears to be
available from the both the Scholarship and the LRP programs
themselves.
An additional participant can always be obtained at the cost of
simply funding one more scholarship, and that is in principle the
measure of loss (plus the duplicated administrative costs of selection and
ultimate placement). The scholarship program has limited funding, and
has always had more applicants than scholarships available. 155
It is not a valid objection that the NHSC would have to wait some
five to nine years for the services of a replacement. The government
could easily protect itself from personnel attrition simply by expanding
the program to reflect the anticipated level of default. The program
would remain fully staffed at the originally desired level, and as long as
the "single" damages (and single imputed interest) for breach made the
government whole for its actual costs, the government would lose
nothing by anticipating and absorbing the breaches. Congress was
aware of the extent of the problem of breach in 1975, and instead of
expanding the program, it responded by trebling the damages. 156
3. The Loan Repayment Program
The NHSC Loan Repayment Program ("LRP") provides still more
direct evidence for replacement costs. 157 Enacted in 1987, at least in part
due to the friction in the Scholarship Program, the LRP 158 pays down a
participant physician's student loans (undergraduate and medical school)
at the rate of $35,000 per year (plus another $9,000 per year to cover
153. The dispute in Swanson itself was caused by the participant's decision to enter a lengthy
surgical residency rather than fulfill his service obligation immediately. Id.
154. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 254d(d) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through Dec. 2006 amendments).
155. See Swanson, 618 F. Supp. at 1235.
156. Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 331-3380 (1976), amended by 42 U.S.C. §§
254d-254r ( 1990).
157. U.S.C. § 2541-l(g)(2)(A), (g)(3)(A) (2006).
158. Id.
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income taxes) in exchange for an agreement to serve in a medical
shortage area. 159 The participants are already licensed physicians at the
time of applying to the program, and they apply to serve at a particular
site only after having seen it, and in some instances, after having already
commenced work at the site. Thus the LRP eliminates much of the
friction that mars the Scholarship Program, because the applicants
already know exactly where they will work when they apply.
Breach of a LRP contract caused (until amendments enacted in
2002) the participant to incur a statutory obligation to repay the amounts
actually received from the government (without imputed interest), 160
plus an "unserved obligation penalty" of $1,000 per month for each
month not served under a two-year contract (but if the participant does
not serve at least one full year, the penalty is the full contract period
multiplied by $1,000). 161 This obligation was far milder than the treble
damages for breach of a scholarship contract, and yet Congress oddly
termed it a "penalty" rather than "damages." The LRP penalty is
payable under the same conditions and for the same loss to the
government as the scholarship treble damages.
The LRP program had in its early years about the same number of
participants as the scholarship program, but it was much more popular,
and physicians' demand for the LRP exceeded its limited funding by far.
Because of the popularity of the LRP, the NHSC was able to recruit
participants to the highest priority (usually least desirable) sites, and so
the annual HPOL list was not the same for the LRP and the Scholarship
programs. 162 Thus, it would be easy in most cases to replace a
Scholarship Program dropout with an LRP participant, the replacement
could be done within a short period of time, and the government's
expected cost would be $44,000 per year, plus the administrative costs
of selection. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the replacement
cost of a Scholarship participant during the years in question was
$44,000 per year, and that if the government cared to fund the LRP
program sufficiently, the NHSC would never lose more than that amount
from a scholarship breach. That amount was roughly the annual cost of
159. The LRP payments have been tax-free since 2002. Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 107-16 115 Stat. 38 (2001).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 254o(c)(l)(A) (2006).
161. MR. KENNEDY, HEALTH CARE SAFETY NET AMENDMENTS OF 2001, S. REP. NO. 107-83,
at 26 (2001), as reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1033, 1057-58. Also, if the participant in a
contract for over two years breaches after the first two years and fails to give a full year's notice (or
such shorter notice as the Secretary determines acceptable for finding a replacement), he is liable for
an additional $10,000.
162. Telephone Interview with Pauline Cooper, supra note 147.
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medical school tuition and living allowance during the years in question.
It follows that the treble damages are exactly what they appear to be: a

penalty intended to coerce performance. 163 The penalty is actually much
stiffer than the treble damages under the Clayton Antitrust Act, because
it includes trebled deemed interest as well. 164 Under antitrust law, the
judge at his discretion may grant at most single prejudgment interest and
even then only if he finds that the defendant deliberately engaged m
dilatory and delaying litigation tactics. 165
4. Third-party Beneficiaries
The Swanson line of cases assumed without analysis that the
government's losses would include harm to the communities affected by
the loss of expected medical services, and it was this loss that the
Swanson court found to be both large and especially difficult to
estimate. 166 But Swanson cited no authority for the proposition that the
community losses would be compensable in an action for breach of
contract, and in fact, it is all but certain that the contrary is true. 167
Vanderbilt teaches us that consequential damages not otherwise
compensable may be included in an enforceable stipulated damages
clause, provided the consequential damages were foreseen and agreed to
by the parties to the contract, but even so, such consequential damages
still must represent (estimated) losses of the promisee, and not losses of
163. Treble damages consist almost by definition of a compensatory portion of one-third, and a
non-compensatory punitive two-thirds. See Field Service Advice Memoranda from Assistant Chief
Counsel on Environmental Protection Fines to District Counsel, Atlanta, 1992 FSA LEXIS 199, at
*9 (Sept. 28, 1992). With particular application to I.R.C. § 162(f), the IRS confirmed this in a 1992
Field Service Advice memorandum concerning the deductibility of environmental fines, although
with some hesitation because the advice requested was in the abstract, without reference to any
particular state or federal environmental statute:
With respect to treble damages, there is specific provision in the Code that prevents a
taxpayer from deducting two thirds of the amount paid to satisfy the judgment or in
settlement of a suit brought under section 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act. l.R.C. § l 62(g).
However, there is no similar provision in the Code relating to treble damages with
respect to violations of environmental laws. Nevertheless, even though there is no
specific provision in the Code, we believe that an argument may be made that two thirds
of any treble damage amount paid to satisfy the judgment or in settlement of a suit
brought under an environmental law could be considered punitive in nature and therefore
nondeductible. Our view is tentative at this point and further information about the
particular statutory provision dealing with treble damages for violation of an
environmental law would need to be evaluated before a definite conclusion can be made.
Id. at *9-* 10.
164. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2540 (2006) with 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006).
165. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
166. United States v. Swanson, 618 F. Supp. 1231, 1243-44 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
167. See id.
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third parties, unless the contract clearly indicates otherwise. 168
There is no authority for the proposition that consequential losses
borne entirely by third parties who are not even mentioned in the
contract can or should be compensable. Such damages cannot be the
foundation for the establishing the reasonableness of a liquidated
damages clause unless at the very least they are explicitly mentioned in
the contract, and perhaps not even then. 169 If a NHSC participant is
hired at a site and leaves prematurely, it is the site employer who suffers
the resulting loss of services, if any, or the site population itself, rather
than the government. There appears to be no reported litigation over
recovery of such losses with respect to a NHSC contract.
However, there is at least one reported case involving just such a
contract between non-governmental parties. In Suthers v. Booker
Hospital District, 170 Suthers, a medical student, entered into a contract
with the Bulah Peery Memorial Scholarship Fund, Inc., a non-profit
Texas corporation of Booker, Texas, under which the Fund was to
support Suthers through medical school. 171 In exchange, Suthers was to
practice medicine for a period of ten years in Booker, which had been
without a physician for 23 years. 172 If Suthers failed to serve, the
contract required him to repay the Fund the moneys advanced plus
interest, and if Suthers failed to serve at least five years, an additional
"penalty" of 50% was to be imposed. 173 Suthers practiced only five
weeks in Booker. 174 The Fund sued and won its investment plus
interest, 175 but other parties joined the suit as well. 176 A group of
residents of Booker who were the intended beneficiaries of Suthers'
services demanded compensation for the loss of the medical services
they expected, and the Booker Hospital District demanded compensation
for an investment it allegedly lost from building a clinic in reliance on
Suthers' contract with the Fund. 177 These third parties lost. 178
The Suthers decision has been cited favorably for its refusal to
allow damages for non-parties to the contract who are incidental third168. See generally Vanderbilt Univ. v. Dinardo, 174 F.3d 751, 756 (6th Cir. 1999).
169. Id. at 757.
170. 543 S.W.2d 723 (Tx. Ct. App. 1976).
171. Id. at 724.
172. Id. at724, 733.
173. Id. at 732.
174. Id. at 725.
175. The Fund apparently did not demand its 50% penalty, and so that was not in issue in the
litigation. See id.
176. Id. at 736.
177. Id. at 725-26.
178. Id. at 729.
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party beneficiaries. 179 The Suthers reasoning would appear to apply a
fortiori to a NHSC contract, because in Suthers the would-be third party
beneficiary patients and investors were at least identifiable at the time of
making the contract, knew of the contract at the time it was made, and so
had some reason to hope to benefit from it. 180 By contrast, in an NHSC
contract, no site population or site employer could have been identifiable
at the time of its making, because that occurs many years before a
participant is matched to any eventual site, if indeed he is ever matched.
It is inconceivable that such unidentifiable parties could have any claim
in their own right to losses from the participant's failure to serve. And it
is difficult to see how the government has any right of its own under the
contract to sue on their behalf. Note, too, that when the government
does collect treble damages, the funds are paid over to the U.S. Treasury
and are not used to increase the funding of the NHSC, 181 much less to
compensate any site employer or local community.
5. Punish, Punish!
The legislative history of the treble damages provision under 42
U.S.C. 2540 makes its purpose reasonably clear. In the first five years
of the program, from 1972 until 1976, the statutory damages for breach
of an NHSC contract were single, that is, return of the amounts advanced
by the government plus imputed interest. 182 The amendment requiring
treble damages was accompanied by the much-quoted statement in the
Senate Report that the program was "not intended as a mechanism solely
to subsidize health professional education," but "as a means to overcome
a geographic maldistribution of health professionals." 183 Judge Colvin
in Hawronsky correctly interpreted this statement to mean that Congress
intended the treble damages to be a penalty. 184 During the hearings, one

179. See Houston Oilers v. Harris County, 960 F. Supp. 1202, 1206 (S.D. Tex. 1997);
Gonzalez v. City of Mission, 620 S.W.2d 918, 922 (Tex. App. 1981); McClellan v. Scardello Ford,
Inc., 619 S.W.2d 593, 597 (Tex. App. 1981); UTL Corp. v. Marcus, 589 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.
App. 1979).
180. Suthers, 543 S.W.2d at 734-35 (Ellis, J., dissenting).
181. U.S.C. § 254o-l(c)(2) provides for a Replacement Fund, which is supposed to use any
treble damages collected from defaulters to finance the training of additional NHSC members.
Curiously, this fund was never established, though it seems to be required by law, and I have been
unable to discover why, not even from the Director of the N.H.S.C. Telephone Interview with Dr.
Don Weaver, supra note 149.
182. Siegler, supra note I0, at 320.
183. Rendleman v. Bowen, 860 F.2d 1537, 1541 (9th Cir.1988).
184. 105 T.C. 94, 99 (1995), affd, 98 F.3d 1338 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v.
Melendez, 944 F.2d 216, 219 (5th Cir. 1991)).
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expert physician objected to the change as "essentially punitive." 185 The
Report can only be read as a statement that the original single-damages
price of breach was too low, so low that it encouraged participants to
default at no real cost, in effect giving them a right to rescind the NHSC
contract at will. And the initial experience of the NHSC confirmed that
many would do so if they found the service obligation inconvenient.
State programs similar to the NHSC existed long before the federal
program, the first being that of Arkansas initiated in 1940, more than
thirty years before the federal program. 186 According to Kristine Byrnes,
at least 25 States have similar scholarship programs, and many have had
similar problems with retention rates. 187 The reaction of the States has
been quite varied. 188 According to Byrnes, most States have simply
accepted the "buy-out" option; 189 others have enacted penalties that
require medium or high rates of interest plus simple repayment of
principal. 190 Only two States charge penalties of double or triple the
amount of the scholarship, 191 and only one State charges doubled
interest. 192 No State charges trebled interest.
The federal penalty is thus by far the stiffest of all the programs.
Even if the federal penalty were fully deductible at the highest 35% rate,
it would still be no higher than the (uniquely) highest State penalty for
the same default. No doubt that is one reason why there is so much
litigation over enforcing it, but little or no reported litigation growing out

185. Health Manpower Legislation, 1975: Hearings on S. 989 Before the Subcomm. On Health
of the Senate Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2017 (1975) (statement of
Tom E. Nesbitt, American Medical Association), quoted in Buongiomo v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 504,
509 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
186. Byrnes,supranote 17,at819.
187. Id. at 820.
188. See id. at 822.
189. Byrnes, supra note 17, at 822 n.114; see also, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, §
12104 (2006) (stating that loans can be repaid or cancelled through service); Miss. CODE ANN. §
37-143-5 (2006) (allowing a recipient to elect to repay with interest or cancel loan through service).
190. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 128275(b)(10) (requiring the full amount plus
interest at 2% above prime at time of contract); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-3267(a)(3) (requiring a
defaulting physician who participated in the state's osteopathic medical service scholarship program
to pay all money loaned plus accrued interest plus 5% interest calculated from date ofreceipt).
191. Byrnes, supra note 17, at 822 n.114; see also, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW§ 605(4) (McKinney
2006) (requiring the penalty to be twice the amount of the loan not discharged by service); 110 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 935/10 (West 2004) (requiring students defaulting on scholarship required to
pay "3 times the amount of the annual scholarship grant for each year the recipient fails to fulfill
such obligation"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-5668(3) (2006) (requiring 125% if repayment recipient
discontinues practice prior to completion of three year requirement).
192. Mo. ANN. STAT.§. 191.540(2) (West 2006) ("Such penalty shall be twice the sum of the
principal and the accrued interest.").
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of the State penalties. 193
The NHSC openly uses the treble damages as a threat to coerce its
participants into locations where they are unwilling to go. We have
already seen that the NHSC orders defaulters (who are not necessarily at
fault, but may simply have run afoul of the NHSC regulations) to sign
"forbearance" agreements acknowledging their present indebtedness for
the treble damages, and agreeing to serve if the government forbears to
enforce the confessed indebtedness. But that in turn removes whatever
little choice the participant may have had, and the NHSC can and does
use this method to order the defaulter to the most undesirable locations
on the HPOL. 194 This use of the penalty obviously has nothing to do
with compensation for any supposed losses, and is simply the means by
which the NHSC attempts to maintain absolute control of the site
selection process.
Indeed, sometimes it even appears that the NHSC would rather
punish disobedience than provide medical care for the underserved. For
example, in Matthews v. Pineo, 195 the Third Circuit reversed a decision
of the District Court to uphold the bankruptcy discharge of one-half of a
debt of nearly $400,000 for NHSC treble damages on the ground that the
defaulting physician had not shown that nondischarge would be
"unconscionable." 196 Although it would be nearly impossible for Dr.
Matthews to pay off her NHSC obligation on her current income of
$85,000 per year, she had not demonstrated to the bankruptcy court that
she could not have earned more by changing her practice or relocating to
a higher paying area. 197 The facts as reported by the Third Circuit
indicate that Dr. Matthews was practicing at the Conneaut Valley Health
Center in Crawford Valley, Pennsylvania, which was in fact on the
NHSC's Opportunity List as needing an internist. 198
Dr. Matthews was not an internist but rather a specialist in family
practice, but she took the position at Conneaut anyway, over the
objection of the NHSC, which had assigned her to South Dakota

193. See supra note 123 (discussing two Illinois decisions).
194. It is difficult to see how any student gains anything from accepting an NHSC scholarship.
If a student is accepted into medical school, he can always finance the education through student
loans. He can always serve the poor later if he chooses, and even obtain the same or similar
financial benefits through a state or federal LRP program all without the risk of incurring the treble
damages penalty.
195. 19 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 1994).
196. Id. at 125.
197. Id. at 124.
198. Id. at 123.
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instead. 199 The result desired by the NHSC seems to have been that Dr.
Matthews should stop treating the poor in an underserved area, and
instead move to a high-paying urban practice so that she can pay off her
damages.
Even more surprising is the case of Buongiorno v. Sullivan, 200 in
which the NHSC interpreted its own regulations regarding waiver of the
service or treble damages for impossibility or unconscionability to mean
that even if it is impossible for a participant to serve through illness or
other incapacity, he must still pay the treble damages. 201 This goes
beyond using punishment as a tool for coercion and appears more like
punishment for its own sake. Judge (now Justice) Thomas, though a
little taken aback at the ruthlessness of the NHSC, nevertheless approved
the NHSC's interpretation because Congress had delegated to the NHSC
the right to make its own rules, and he reversed the lower court's more
humane determination that the NHSC' s regulations as interpreted were
unreasonable. 202
Whether the NHSC's strict command-and-control regulations and
its enormous powers of punishment are really necessary for the success
of its mission is beyond the scope of this article. Having taken the
reader this far, however, it seems worth pointing out that the Director of
the NHSC now allocates as much of the NHSC's funds as possible to the
Loan Repayment Program and as little as possible to the Scholarship
program. 203 This would appear to indicate that he has come to agree
with the judgment of Kristine Byrnes that the LRP would generate far
less friction. 204 On the other hand, friction and litigation may start up

199. Id. at 123.
200. 912 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that NHSC was within its authority to interpret 42
U.S.C. § 254o(d)(2) to mean that even if service would involve extreme hardship, waiver of
payment participant must show separately and independently that enforcing payment would also
involve extreme hardship or unconscionability). In Buongiorno, the participant demanded a waiver
of service because his wife's medical condition rendered her immobile and she could not receive
adequate treatment in remote places. Id. The court ultimately held that a participant must pay the
treble damages even if he is completely without fault. Id. This interpretation is as illogical as it is
heartless. If the participant must pay anyway, it is pointless to apply for the proffered waiver of
service. After all, participants can always "waive" the service obligation unilaterally and at any
time if they are willing to buy their way out. The NHSC apparently would force every participant to
pay, even one who is utterly incapacitated for service, if he has or can find the means to pay, say
through an inheritance or (why not?) even a personal injury damages award compensating him for
his incapacity.
201. Id. at 510.
202. Id. at 508.
203. Telephone Interview with Dr. Don Weaver, supra note 149.
204. Byrnes, supra note 17, at 846.
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now in the LRP too, because in 2002 legislation, 205 Congress increased
the amount of the penalty for breach of an LRP agreement from $1,000
per unserved month to $7,500 per month. 206 The sole explanation
Congress offered for this change was that the unserved obligation
penalty would now be more nearly equal to that for breach of a
scholarship agreement. 207

C. The Errors in Hawronsky
1. The Untrebled Deemed Interest is Compensatory and
Deductible
The Hawronsky Court appeared to take the statutory formula for
NHSC treble damages at its face value and treat the single damages as
A necessary consequence of this (correct)
actual damages. 208
interpretation is that the single deemed interest is an element of
compensatory damages and thus deductible. The deemed interest called
for in the treble damages clause is not interest for tax purposes, but
rather an element of damages to compensate the government for the loss
of the use of its money. It is not interest for tax purposes because the
taxpayer incurred no indebtedness at the time of entering into the
scholarship contract.
Unfortunately this issue was completely
overlooked.
It is well established that in the absence of actual indebtedness
which is presently enforceable, there can be no interest for tax
purposes. 209 This rule applies to all types of contingent debt even if the
contingent debt does become actual and enforceable after some
intervening event. In that case, only the interest that accrues after the
debt becomes actual and enforceable is interest for tax purposes, and
"interest" that accrued before the debt became enforceable may be

205. Health Care Safety Net Amendments of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-251, sec. 1533, § 313, 116
Stat. 1621, 1651-52 (2002).
206. 42 U.S.C. § 254o(c)(l)(B) (2006).
207. MR. KENNEDY, HEALTH CARE SAFETY NET AMENDMENTS OF 2001, S. REP. NO. 107-83,
at 26 (2001), as reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1033, 1057-58. The report states in pertinent part
that the Act " ... revise[ s] the loan repayment default provision by increasing the unserved
obligation penalty from $1,000 per month to $7,500 per month. The value of the loss of a
clinician's services to an underserved community (upon default) should be roughly equal under both
the scholarship and loan repayment programs. However, the average loan repayment debt is
$57,948, while the average scholarship debt is $252,296." Id.
208. Hawronsky v. Comm'r, 105 T.C. 94, 100-01 (1995), ajj"d, 98 F.3d 1338 (5th Cir. 1996).
209. Rozpad v. Comm'r, 154 F.3d 1, 2 (!st Cir. 1998).
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recoverable as an element of damages for the loss of the use of principal,
210
but it is not interest for tax purposes.
This rule applies, for example,
to "pre-judgment interest" that is an element of damages, but is not
interest for tax purposes because no valid and enforceable debt is created
until judgment. 211 The IRS itself acknowledged that this rule applies to
the very same NHSC treble damages at issue in Hawronsky in its own
memorandum, 212 which explicitly states that the deemed interest of the
damages clause is not interest for tax purposes for exactly this reason,
citing (correctly) Appeal of Bettendorf.213 The single imputed interest
was clearly compensatory by the government's own analysis as well as
the Tax Court's, and a deduction should have been allowed because it is
not a penalty.
2. For the Violation of Any Law
An even greater mistake in Hawronsky was that the court
completely overlooked the final phrase of I.R.C. § 162(f) "for the
violation of any law," which was neither briefed nor discussed. 214 Even
if damages paid to a government are indisputably punitive in nature, in
order to fall within the disallowance provision, the penalty must still be
paid "for the violation of any law." Thus, punitive damages payable to a
government in a tort action presumably are not within the ambit of
I.R.C. § 162(f), nor is a penalty clause in a government contract, no
matter how egregious the breach or how punitive the ensuing damages
may be, unless they are imposed for the violation of a law. 215 Although
the phrase has apparently never been interpreted in a judicial decision,
the IRS has acknowledged at least once, in GCM 39596, 216 which
210. Id. at 5.
211. See e.g., id. (citing cases supporting this proposition). See generally Alice G. Abreu,
Distinguishing Interest from Damages: A Proposal for a New Perspective, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 373,
398-414 (1992).
212. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,336 (Feb. 5, 1985) (concluding that I.R.C. § 265 prevents
deduction of the treble damages).
213. 3 B.T.A. 378, 385 (1926) (finding that damages for wrongful detention of funds is not
interest on indebtedness for tax purposes).
214. Hawronsky v. Comm'r, 105 T.C. 94 (1995), ajf'd, 98 F.3d 1338 (5th Cir. 1996). The Tax
Court's decision in Hawronsky was affirmed without opinion by the Fifth Circuit. 98 F.3d 1338.
215. There seems to be no reported example of either, apart from Hawronsky.
216. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,596 (Sept. 26, 1986). This General Counsel Memorandum
was issued subsequent to, but did not mention, Hawronsky. The taxpayer had imported
commodities into the United States for less than the manufacturer's cost or "fair value." Id. The
Commerce Department found that this did or was likely to injure local industry, which in tum
triggered an obligation to pay anti-dumping duties. Id. The IRS found that the purpose and effect
of the statute was remedial in nature, and that the quantum of duties imposed under the statute did

164

AKRON TAX JOURNAL

(22:129

concerned the deductibility of anti-dumping duties, that the phrase has
independent significance and must be satisfied before I.RC. § 162(f) can
apply.211
The Tax Court appears to have been at least dimly aware of this
difficulty when it insisted that the taxpayer "violated" obligations that
are "established by statute" rather than by contract. 218 The implication
seems to be that because the terms of the NHSC contract, including the
definition of "breach" and the quantum of "damages" are fixed by
statute, a violation of the contract is ipso facto a violation of law. Or
perhaps Judge Colvin meant to suggest even more, that the NHSC
contract is not a contract at all, but rather a "law."
This second interpretation is easily refuted. In United States v.
Westerband-Garcia, 219 the defendant had signed an NHSC contract, but
he failed to apply for a deferment or to fulfill his service obligation. 220
The government sued for breach of contract, and the participant argued
that the statute of limitations provision in 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) 221 barred
the government's action to collect damages. 222 In holding that the
statute of limitations did apply to the NHSC scholarship agreement, the
Court of Appeals stated:
We reject the government's understanding of the NHSC scholarship
agreement as noncontractual. Throughout the statute establishing the
National Health Service Corps Scholarship Program, 42 U.S.C. § 2541,
Congress described the agreement between the scholarship recipient
and government as a "contract." This plain language indicates that
Congress intended the NHSC scholarship agreement to be a contract.

not exceed the amount necessary to equalize competition with U.S. produced commodities. Id.
This alone would preclude the application of I.R.C. § 162(f). However, the IRS also pointed out
that the settlement agreement between the taxpayer and the United States specifically recited that to
the government's knowledge the taxpayer's conduct had violated no law. Id. According to the
Memorandum, the terms of the agreement should be respected for tax purposes, and thus no
"violation of law" existed which could trigger I.R.C. § 162(f). Id. The government carefully
limited this concession in the agreement to any violation of the customs laws. Id. Thus the
Memorandum suggests that even if the anti-dumping duties imposed under the statute exceeded the
amount necessary for remediation, they would nevertheless be deductible despite 1.R.C. § 162(f).
Id.
217. Id.
218. See id.
219. 35 F.3d418 (9th Cir. 1994).
220. Id. at 419.
221. Section 24 l 5(a) provides, in pertinent part, that "every action for money damages brought
by the United States ... which is founded upon any contract expressed or implied in law or fact,
shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action accrues." 28
U.S.C. 24 l 5(a) (2007).
222. Westerband-Garcia, 35 FJd at 420.
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Further, the agreement the scholarship recipient signs are labeled a
contract. The fact that the parties do not bargain for the terms of the
agreement, but must take the terms as set forth in 42 U.S.C. 2541, does
not mean that the agreement is not a contract .
The government's reliance on Rendleman v. Bowen and United States
v. Hatcher to support its position that the scholarship agreement is not
. m1sp
. Iace d.22j
a contract 1s

Without question, the NHSC agreement is a contract. Does the fact
that the terms of the contract are fixed by statute render a breach of the
contract a "violation of law" within the meaning of I.R.C. § 162(f)? The
answer is clearly negative for several reasons.
First, although the phrase "violation of any law" is nowhere
defined, and "law" is a highly ambiguous term, it seems clear that what
Congress meant was violation of a criminal statute or a civil statute of
general application. In ordinary language, the phrase "violation of a[ ny]
law" is a synonym for "breaking the law," and means noncompliance
with a statute or government regulation of general application. The
Supreme Court has said more than once that when interpreting the Code,
one "should look to the 'ordinary everyday senses' of the words." 224
One does not normally speak of actionable negligence or breach of
contract as "violation of a law," notwithstanding that there exists a "law"
of torts and a "law" of contracts. 225 If this wider sense of "law" had
been intended in I.RC. § 162(f), the phrase "violation of law" would
apply even to all forms of compensatory damages, because they are
necessarily imposed by some "law" (e.g. of contracts), and thus the
phrase would be pointless surplusage in the statute. 226
It is a
fundamental canon of statutory interpretation that the words of a statute
must be given some meaning wherever possible. 227
Second, the legislative history makes very clear that I.RC. § 162(f)
was intended to codify prior law, which applied exclusively to fines and
223. See id. at 420-21 (citations omitted); United States v. Hatcher, 922 F.2d 1402 (9th Cir.
1991); Rendleman v. Bowen, 860 F.2d 1537 (9th Cir. 1988).
224. Comm'r v. Soliman, 506 U.S. 168, 173 (1993) (quoting Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569
(1966)).
225. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 27-28 (2d ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1962).
226. Note also that in order to be valid, every contract with the government must be made
pursuant to some statute. Even a run of the mill procurement contract must be authorized directly or
indirectly by some appropriations law. If breach of a procurement contract is ipso facto a "violation
of law" it would follow that the statutory language is largely superfluous, at least as it relates to
contracts. Any and all breaches of a government contract would constitute a "violation of law."
227. MIKE SINCLAIR, A GUIDE TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 146 (2000) (citing Stowers V.
Wolodzko, 191N.W.2d355, 362 (Mich. 1971)).
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penalties under criminal statutes and to certain statutory civil tax
penalties, all of which are rules of general application intended to deter
and penalize all persons who fail to abide by the statute. 228 The Senate
Report states that "[i]n approving the provisions dealing with fines and
similar penalties in 1969, it was the intention of the committee to
disallow deductions for payments of sanctions which are imposed under
civil statutes but which in general terms serve the same purpose as a fine
exacted under a criminal statute."229 It seems impossible to squeeze into
this category damages for breach of an obligation that is incurred only
by voluntary agreement.
Third, there is case law that indirectly confirms that the NHSC
treble damages clause is not subject to I.RC. § 162(£). Even where a
penalty clause is required by a statute to be included in a government
contract, as in the NHSC contract at issue in Hawronsky, it is still the
purpose of the penalty that governs the analysis under I.RC. § 162(£). If
the penalty serves the sole purpose of coercing performance, there is
presumptively no public policy at stake. Put another way, if a nongovernmental party might enter into a similar contract and might wish to
coerce performance by including a similar penalty, then the government
is not acting in its governmental capacity, and the penalty is not
punishment for violating "sharply defined national or state policies
proscribing particular types of conduct."230
There is no reason why a non-governmental civic group might not
contract to pay a medical student's expenses in exchange for his promise
to serve in the community following graduation, and in fact, Suthers v.
Booker Hospital Districr31 is just such a case. In the Suthers contract
the civic group has the same incentive to include a penalty for nonperformance that any other contracting party has, namely to coerce
performance. 232 If a government is substituted for the civic group, and
includes a penalty for exactly the same purpose, the penalty should be
outside the reach of I.RC. § 162(£) because the penalty serves no public
policy of deterring prohibited behavior.
This analysis is confirmed by a pre-codification decision on
precisely this point, and oddly enough it was cited in the Hawronsky

228. Treas. Reg.§ l.162-2l(c) (1975) (giving eight examples of statutes or regulations of this
sort).
229. S. REP. No. 92-437 (1971), reprinted in 1971U.S.C.C.A.N.1918, 1980 (emphasis added).
230. Comm'r v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 473 (1943).
231. 543 S.W.2d 723, (Tex. App. 1976). See supra notes 170-78 and accompanying text
(discussing Suthers).
232. 543 S.W.2d at 729.
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opinion itself, 233 although its significance was unfortunately overlooked.
In McGraw-Edison Co. v. United States, 234 the taxpayer had entered into
government contracts to produce fuses, and as required by the WalshHealey Public Contracts Act, the contracts contained liquidated damages
clauses designed to prohibit the employment of boys under 16 and girls
under 18 years of age from performing the contracts by penalizing the
company the sum of $10 per worker per day for any violations. 235 The
taxpayer paid the liquidated damages for violation of the child-labor
penalty provisions in the contracts, deducted the penalties, and sued to
recover overpaid income taxes. 236 The Court of Claims denied the
deductions under the public policy doctrine, and its analysis is
illuminating. 237 The court stated explicitly that contractual penalties
may be deducted even if prescribed by statute, unless, as in Hawronsky,
the statute has a public-policy purpose unrelated to the objectives of the
contract:
Obviously these "damage" payments were not designed to make the
United States whole for any loss which it incurred. Conceivably child
labor is poor labor, but the $ l 0 per day sum is not related to defects in
workmanship. Nor can it be said that the plaintiff was unjustly
enriched by the use of underage employees.
To be sure amounts paid by a contractor to a private party as
"penalties" for failure to comply with its obligations under the contract
would ordinarily be deductible since no specific legislation there
expresses a state policy. Similarly amounts paid to a governmental
agency as penalties to secure performance of a contract could properly
be regarded as a "necessary" expense of doing business within the
meaning of the Tank Truck case even if prescribed by statute. But here
the sums paid under the Walsh-Healey provisions of the contract are
wholly unrelated to the specific objectives designed to be secured by
that particular agreement. The Government in requiring that the
clauses in question be inserted in its contracts was not acting like a
private purchaser of fuses, but was using, legitimately, its far-reaching
power to contract as it pleases to secure objectives of a social and
economic nature. The purpose of the Walsh-Healey Act "is to use the
leverage of the Government's immense purchasing power to raise
labor standards." The source of national power cannot, of course,

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Hawronsky v. Comm'r, 105 T.C. 94, 98 (1995), ajf'd, 98 F.3d 1338 (5th Cir. 1996).
300 F.2d 453 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
Id. at 454.
Id. at 453.
Id. at 456.
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affect the sharpness of national policy. Thus, we conclude that the
damages provided for by the contract were in fact penalties designed to
assure that child labor would not be used in the performance of
'
2:f8
government contracts and, as such, are not deductible.

By contrast, the NHSC damages are intended solely to secure
performance of its contracts. The penalty does not further any unrelated
social welfare objectives, or deter any undesirable behavior other than
nonperformance of the contract. It is irrelevant that increased rural
health care is in the public interest. The production of properly
functioning weaponry for the military is no less important, but it is quite
clear that penalties for late or non-conforming production would be
deductible even if the contractual penalties were required by statute.
III. CONCLUSION
The decision in Hawronsky is erroneous (among other problems)
because the taxpayer violated no law. A wider conclusion one may draw
is that Hawronsky is (yet more) evidence that the codification of I.R.C. §
162(f) did not fulfill Congress' hope for simplification and did not end
uncertainty and confusion by preempting the "public policy" doctrine.
This doctrine appears to be alive and well in spite of its supposed
statutory demise in 1969.
A more disturbing conclusion is that the courts have deferred to the
government in nearly every aspect of litigation with the NHSC, both
with respect to enforcement of the treble damages and to their
deductibility, sometimes in violation of the law, or common sense, or
both, as if it were absolutely essential that the NHSC should prevail at
any cost. This despite the fact that the treble damages penalty itself is
very questionable as a policy matter. Congress was unwise to enact the
treble damages, as it was unwise to enact I.R.C. § 162(f). The NHSC
has made unnecessarily cruel use of the penalty, and the IRS made
erroneous interpretations of law. The lawyers representing the NHSC
victims of the treble damages often failed to identify essential issues, and
the courts allowed the government to steamroller them. The final irony
is that of all the actors in this drama, including Congress, the courts, the
NHSC bureaucracy, and the lawyers on both sides, Dr. Hawronsky may
arguably be the only party who did not act in violation of some public
policy.

238.

McGraw-Edison Co., 300 F.2d at 456 (citations omitted).

